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by H. Patrick Furman
T he appellate courts in Colorado
have issued a number of deci-
sions in the past few years deal-
ing with self-defense. While
these decisions did not make significant
breaks with prior case law, they did clar-
ify some issues relating to the defense.
This article reviews the basic law of self-
defense and these recent decisions.
The Basic Principles
The law of self-defense has been codi-
fied, along with affirmative defenses gen-
erally, in CRS § 18-1-701 et seq. CRS § 18-
1-704 reads:
A person is justified in using physical
force upon another person in order to
defend himself or a third person from
what he reasonably believes to be the
use or imminent use of unlawful phys-
ical force by that other person, and he
may use a degree of force which he
reasonably believes to be necessary
for that purpose.'
Subsequent sections establish the "make-
my-day law,"2 the right to defend prem-
ises,3 the right to defend property 4 and
the right to use force in making an arrest.5
Self-defense is an affirmative defense6
-that is, one that generally admits the
doing of the act but offers a legal justifi-
cation for it. 7 This means that unless the
prosecution's case-in-chief raises evi-
dence of self-defense, a defendant who
wishes to raise self-defense has the bur-
den of presenting "some credible evi-
dence" on the issue.8 Once such evidence
is raised, the burden shifts back to the
prosecution to disprove self-defense be-
yond a reasonable doubt.9 The determi-
nation of whether an affirmative de-
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fense has been raised by the evidence is
made by the trial court.10
In Colorado, a person is entitled to act
on appearances when exercising self-de-
fense: a reasonable belief that you are in
danger entitles you to defend yourself,
even to the extent of taking human life,
even though it may later turn out that
you were mistaken about the danger."i
It also is true in Colorado that a person
who is under attack need not retreat in
the face of that attack before lawfully
exercising the right of self-defense, 12 even
to the extent of using deadly force.' 3
In certain circumstances, an individ-
ual may lawfully use self-defense even if
he or she started the fight. An initial ag-
gressor who withdraws from the fight
and communicates this intention to the
other person has the right to lawfully ex-
ercise self-defense if the other person,
despite knowledge of the initial aggres-
sor's intent to withdraw, continues the
fight. The initial aggressor must retreat,
however, because the no-retreat doctrine
has generally not been extended to ini-
tial aggressors.' 4 It is for the jury to de-
termine whether the initial aggressor
adequately communicated his or her in-
tention to withdraw.15
Self-defense may be used to defend
against most homicide and assault
charges. One exception to this general
proposition is that self-defense is not
available against a charge of felony mur-
derS Other exceptions are discussed be-
low. With the right facts, self-defense may
be used against a charge of resisting ar-
rest 17 and menacing.'8 The Colorado Su-
preme Court has not decided whether
self-defense can be used to defend against
the charge of prohibited use of weap-
ons 19 or criminal mischief.20 In certain
circumstances, when more than two peo-
ple are involved in a fight, aggressive acts
by one person may justify the use of force
against another person.21
Raising the Defense
As noted, unless the prosecution's case-
in-chief raises evidence of self-defense,
the defendant is obligated to present
"some credible evidence" of self-defense.22
The Colorado Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that where there is any evi-
dence tending to establish self-defense,
the defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed with respect to that defense.23
However, in the recent case of People v.
Wilner,24 the Supreme Court appeared
to retreat from this principle, at least on
the subsidiary issue of the no-retreat
doctrine. The defendant shot and killed
a man who was repossessing his car. The
defendant testified that he heard his car
backing out of the driveway and ran out-
side with a gun, that the car began to
drive toward him and that he retreated
and fired warning shots before firing the
fatal shot. Other evidence contradicted
these claims.
The Supreme Court found that the no-
retreat doctrine did not apply here be-
cause the record did not support the de-
fendant's claim that he was not the ini-
tial aggressor or, that if he was, he with-
drew and communicated his withdrawal
to the victim. The dissenting justice ar-
gued that the defendant's testimony was
all that was required to make applicable
the no-retreat doctrine and mandate an
instruction on the issue.
While the burden on the defendant to
present "some evidence" is a low burden,
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it is not a meaningless one. The evidence
in People v. Williams 25 established that
the defendant's brother was involved in
a fight and that the defendant put a knife
to the throat of an onlooker and warned
him not to interfere, then got involved in
the fight himself. When the onlooker
tried to break up the fight, the defendant
put the knife to his throat again. The
Court of Appeals found this record devoid
of "any indication that the defendant
could have held a reasonable belief that
the man he threatened with the knife
was engaged in the imminent use of un-
lawful physical force against the defen-
dant's brother."26 Therefore, no self-de-
fense instruction was required.
Imminent Danger
As noted, a person claiming self-de-
fense must be responding to what the
person reasonably believes to be the use
or imminent use of unlawful physical
force against himself or herself. The Col-
orado Court of Appeals has held that self-
defense is not available in a contract mur-
der case. At first glance, this seems like
an obvious and easy result to reach: if an
individual took the time to hire someone
to do the killing, it is hard to imagine that
the individual was in imminent danger.
This is not the time or place to discuss
contract law, but everyone knows how
difficult and protracted contract negoti-
ations can be. This is particularly true
with hired killers. Obviously, any threat
would be long over well before the actu-
al hit took place.
However, when this issue was raised
in People v. Yaklich, 27 it was not quite as
simple as it seemed. The defendant was
the wife of a police officer who was shot
to death in the driveway of the family
home while she lay sleeping inside. A pair
of young men who lived nearby were sub-
sequently arrested, and these men told
the police they had been hired by the de-
fendant to kill her husband. The defen-
dant admitted she had hired the men, but
claimed that she hired them because she
was in great fear for her life. She claimed
that her husband beat her regularly and
that she was afraid to go to the police be-
cause her husband was, after all, a police
officer.
The defendant was allowed to present
evidence of self-defense, including expert
testimony about the battered wife syn-
drome. The expert testimony suggested
that a woman2 who suffers from the syn-
drome can quite reasonably be in fear
for her safety even if she is not under at-
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tack at that moment because of the cycli-
cal nature of the violence by the batterer.
The jury acquitted the defendant of mur-
der but found her guilty of conspiracy.
The prosecution appealed the trial
court rulings that allowed the defendant
to present self-defense to the jury. The
Court of Appeals disapproved the rul-
ings and held that self-defense is simply
unavailable in the context of a contract
murder. While sympathetic to the bat-
tered woman syndrome, and while rec-
ognizing that such evidence is appropri-
ate and important in many cases, the
court refused to stretch the meaning of





defendant is obligated to
present 'some credible
evidence' of self-defense."
Retreat to the Wall
The Colorado Supreme Court consid-
ered the retreat-to-the-wall doctrine in
Idrogo v. People,2 in which the defendant
was accosted by two drunken men out-
side a liquor store who asked for drugs.
The defendant and his companion re-
fused and attempted to leave. When the
men followed them, the defendant pulled
a knife and warned the men to go away.
They did not, a fight ensued, and the de-
fendant stabbed one of the men to death.
The defendant was convicted of reckless
manslaughter.
On appeal, all parties agreed that a
general self-defense instruction was ap-
propriate. All parties also agreed that a
general retreat-to-the-wall instruction
was appropriate. However, the prosecu-
tion argued that the instruction that was
given to the jury went too far. The pros-
ecution argued that while there is no
general duty to retreat, there is a duty
to retreat before employing deadly force,
and that the jury should be so instructed.
The Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument and concluded that "an innocent
victim of an assault is not bound to re-
treat before using deadly force when the
use of such force is reasonable under the
circumstances."30 The principle that there
December
is no duty to retreat applies regardless
of the level of force an individual uses to
defend himself or herself. It is important
to remember that there is always a re-
quirement that the amount of force used
be appropriate. A person must be in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury or death
before he or she can use deadly force to
defend. However, a person who is in fear
of serious bodily injury or death need not
retreat before using deadly force.
Apparent Necessity
The question in Hare v. People31 and
Beckett v. People3 2 was whether the stan-
dard self-defense instruction adequately
conveyed to the jury the "apparent ne-
cessity" doctrine. The apparent necessi-
ty doctrine holds that an apparent need
to defend oneself, if reasonably ground-
ed, justifies the use of self-defense to the
same extent as actual necessity. A four-
person majority of the Supreme Court
reached the conclusion that an instruc-
tion that tracks CRS § 18-1-704 adequate-
ly instructs the jury on the doctrine.
The court in Hare held that the self-
defense statute takes into account the
reasonable belief of an individual who
has exercised force in self-defense. It en-
compasses the apparent necessity doc-
trine and allows the "jury to consider
from the defendant's viewpoint whether
the defendant was justified in using phy-
sical force in self-defense .... ,,34 Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting the more detailed instruction
tendered by the defendant. The three dis-
senters argued that the instruction that
was given did not clearly inform the jury
of the defendant's right to act on appear-
ances.
The Mens Rea Issue
The self-defense statute justifies the
use of force only if a person reasonably
believes there is imminent danger and
only to the extent that the person uses a
reasonable degree of force. Therefore, a
person who is properly using force to de-
fend himself or herself is, by definition,
acting reasonably. At the same time, the
analysis should take into account the
fact that "detached reflection cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted
knife."- If the mens rea requirement of
a particular offense is less than reason-
ableness-such as recklessness, negli-
gence or strict liability--should a defen-
dant still be allowed to claim self-defense?
The Supreme Court has held that self-
defense is not available against a charge
2718 /THE COLORADO LAWYER I DECEMBER 1995 /VoL. 24, No. 12
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of reckless manslaughter or criminally
negligent homicide because a finding of
recklessness or negligence necessarily
precludes a finding that the defendant
acted reasonably.36 Recklessness involves
a conscious disregard of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk; negligence in-
volves a gross deviation from a reason-
able standard of care resulting in a fail-
ure to perceive a substantial and unjus-
tifiable risk.3 7 Both states of mind are
inconsistent with reasonableness. Even
though a defendant who is charged with
a reckless or negligent offense is not en-
titled to a self-defense instruction, evi-
dence of self-defense may still be present-
ed in an effort to persuade the jury that
the conduct was not reckless or negligent.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals has
held that self-defense is not available
against a charge of extreme indifference
murder.38 Extreme indifference murder
requires evidence of universal malice
manifesting an extreme indifference to-
ward human life generally. This mens
rea requirement has been interpreted to
mean aggravated or extremely reckless
conduct.3 9 A finding of such conduct nec-
essarily precludes a finding that the de-
fendant acted reasonably in self-defense.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has held that self-defense is available
against charges of heat of passion man-
slaughter 4" and attempted heat of pas-
sion manslaughter. 41 Distinguishing
reckless manslaughter from heat of pas-
sion manslaughter, the court noted that
even a reasonable person may react in-
stinctively and passionately to a great
provocation.42 The heat of passion princi-
ple simply recognizes this human frailty.
The "Make My Day" Defense
The "make my day" statute creates cer-
tain additional rights of self-defense. CRS
§ 18-1-704.5 provides that the occupant
of a dwelling is justified in using any de-
gree of physical force against a person
who has unlawfully entered the dwelling,
if the occupant reasonably believes that
the intruder has committed, is commit-
ting, or is about to commit a crime in ad-
dition to the unlawful entry, and also rea-
sonably believes that the intruder might
use any physical force against any occu-
pant.
The statute goes further than other
forms of self-defense by providing for im-
munity from prosecution (as well as from
civil liability), rather than merely estab-
lishing an affirmative defense. Based on
this difference, the Supreme Court held
that the burden of proving the applica-
bility of the statute rests on the defen-
dant, who must prove applicability by a
preponderance of the evidence. 4" Resolu-
tion of the issue should be conducted by
way of a pretrial hearing. Conflicting ev-
idence as to the applicability of the stat-
ute must be resolved by the trial court,
and appellate courts will defer to the tri-
al court's findings. 44 A defendant who los-
es at the pretrial hearing may still pre-
sent self-defense to the jury."
It is generally assumed that the "make
my day" defense is available against the
full range of charges in which self-de-
fense is available, as discussed above.
Appellate decisions have held the de-
fense available against charges of first-
degree murder,46 second-degree mur-
der,47 first-degree assault,48 second- and
third-degree assault49 and heat of pas-
sion manslaughter.50
Several of the terms in the statute have
been litigated. The term "dwelling" is de-
fined in CRS § 18-1-901(3)(g) as "a build-
ing which is used, intended to be used, or
usually used by a person for habitation."
In People v. Cushinberry,51 the Court of
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Appeals held that a defendant sitting on
a windowsill in his apartment building
was not entitled to the protection of the
statute because the stairwell, which was
a common area and not part of the de-
fendant's apartment, did not constitute
a dwelling for the purposes of the stat-
ute.
The phrase "unlawful entry" also has
been the subject of litigation. The Court
of Appeals has held that a person who
invited another into his home could not
claim the protection of the statute be-
cause an invitee does not make an un-
lawful entry.52 The trial court had inter-
preted the phrase "unlawful entry" to
include the concept, familiar from bur-
glary cases, of remaining unlawfully af-
ter an initially proper entry. However,
the Court of Appeals noted that the leg-
islature did not include the "remain law-
fully" language in the "make my day"
statute.
In People v. Malczewski,53 the defen-
dant used force against a police officer
who was attempting to enter the defen-
dant's home to follow up on a report of a
baby in danger inside the home. The tri-
al court found that the officer's entry was
illegal and that the defendant could rea-
sonably have believed that the officer was
about to commit the crime of kidnapping.
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that
the entry was lawful under the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement and finding no evidence to
support a reasonable belief that the offi-
cer was about to commit a crime.
The most recent Supreme Court dis-
cussion of the "unlawful entry" language
occurred in People v. McNeese.54 The issue
was whether an entry in violation of an
oral agreement in a lease constituted an
unlawful entry. The trial court granted
the defendant immunity from prosecu-
tion on the ground that the entry was un-
lawful, but the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded. A majority of the court
held that the appropriate question is
whether the entry was "a knowing viola-
tion of the criminal law." The court also
held that the appearance of an unlawful
entry does not satisfy this standard:
there must be an actual unlawful entry.
While the court suggested that this
entry, in violation of the lease agreement,
did not meet this standard, the court re-
manded the case for further proceedings
on the question. The concurring opinion
argued that the appropriate definition of
unlawful entry was "an entry into a dwell-
ingin violation of criminal law." The dis-
sent argued that the majority was ignor-
ing the plain language of the statute and
engaging in judicial legislation.
All three opinions contain significant
discussions of the statute and should be
read by anyone with a "make my day"
case.
Conclusion
The right of self-defense has strong
roots in both history and the law. The ba-
sic parameters of the defense, set out by
statute, have remained unchanged for
some time. Perhaps reflecting this state's
frontier history, Colorado does not im-
pose a duty to retreat, even when deadly
force is employed; analyzes self-defense
from the point of view of the person be-
ing attacked; and has created special ex-
emptions from liability for self-defense
exercised in the home. Nonetheless, there
are limits on the use of this defense, and
practitioners on both sides of a case must
familiarize themselves with the case law
to prosecute and defend these cases prop-
erly. Finally, there are a number of evi-
dentiary issues that commonly arise in
self-defense cases, and counsel must re-
view this law as well.
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